Weak independence and the Pareto principle
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Publication:331709
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0960-5zbMath1392.91049OpenAlexW2346611449MaRDI QIDQ331709
Publication date: 27 October 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0960-5
Related Items (2)
Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence ⋮ A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
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