The political economy of (de)centralization with complementary public goods

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0962-3zbMath1392.91090OpenAlexW2339990835MaRDI QIDQ331710

Guillaume Cheikbossian

Publication date: 27 October 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/21653/1/cheikbossian_21653.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

spilloverscomplements(de)centralizationlocal public goodsstrategic delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Order restricted preferences and majority rule
• Strategic delegation of environmental policy making
• Cournot-Walras and locally consistent equilibria
• Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
• Aggregate comparative statics
• The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods
• Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
• Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms Have Local Knowledge of Demand
• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly

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