Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0970-3zbMath1392.91033OpenAlexW2411090272MaRDI QIDQ331724

Marco Faravelli, Bang Dinh Nguyen, Priscilla T. Y. Man

Publication date: 27 October 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0970-3

zbMATH Keywords

power sharingelectoral systemPareto dominationvoluntary votingwelfare comparison

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations

Cites Work

• Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations

This page was built for publication: Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing