Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
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Publication:3320078
DOI10.2307/2648754zbMath0535.90009OpenAlexW2041580645WikidataQ56212389 ScholiaQ56212389MaRDI QIDQ3320078
Publication date: 1983
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ee8ac5b22eba512d4c1c2f53bae9b39562a308ec
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