A Welfare Analysis of Employment Contracts with and without Asymmetric Information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3320083
DOI10.2307/2297435zbMATH Open0535.90016OpenAlexW2063676185MaRDI QIDQ3320083
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297435
labor marketconstrained Pareto optimalityincomplete risk marketsrandom production technologieswelfare economics of employment contracts
Related Items (5)
Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market ⋮ A characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information ⋮ Private Information, Wage Bargaining and Employment Fluctuations ⋮ Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy: The Effect of Interest Rates on Layoffs ⋮ Who Benefits from Workers with General Skills? Countervailing Incentives in Labour Contracts
This page was built for publication: A Welfare Analysis of Employment Contracts with and without Asymmetric Information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3320083)
