Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
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Publication:3321780
DOI10.1137/0605028zbMath0536.90004OpenAlexW2071989092MaRDI QIDQ3321780
Publication date: 1984
Published in: SIAM Journal on Algebraic Discrete Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0605028
votinginteger optimizationgroup choicerepresentative systemscyclic majoritiescombinatorial impossibility theoremsdiscrete ranking structureslinear separation lemmasnested hierarchies of sign functions
Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Discrete mathematics in relation to computer science (68R99)
Related Items (7)
How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names ⋮ Higher dimensional restricted lattice paths with diagonal steps ⋮ Robustness against inefficient manipulation ⋮ From enumerating to generating: a linear time algorithm for generating 2D lattice paths with a given number of turns ⋮ Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ An information and preference theory approach to a discrete resource allocation problem
Cites Work
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- Condorcet's paradox
- Heights of representative systems
- Condorcet proportions and Kelly's conjectures
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
- Optimal pairs of score vectors for positional scoring rules
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Proportions of profiles with a majority candidate
- On the sum-of-ranks winner when losers are removed
- Proportional representation in variable-size legislatures
- The Voting Problem
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives
- Three-valued representative systems
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Formal Structure of Majority Decision
- The Theory of Representative Majority Decision
- Social Choice Functions
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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