The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
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Publication:3321782
DOI10.2307/2297711zbMath0536.90006OpenAlexW2104538315MaRDI QIDQ3321782
Publication date: 1984
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297711
public decisionbalanced set of transfersconditional auction mechanismfirst-bid auctionmirror-image effect
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