On the Economics of International Fisheries

DOI10.2307/2648869zbMath0537.90022OpenAlexW4253693883MaRDI QIDQ3323646

Carl Chiarella, Koji Okuguchi, Murray C. Kemp, Ngo Van Long

Publication date: 1984

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2648869

zbMATH Keywords

open-looprenewable resource depletioninternational fisheriessocially-optimal Nash equilibrium path

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (18)

Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games ⋮ Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly ⋮ Time Consistency in Cooperative Differential Games: A Tutorial ⋮ Sustainability of Cooperation in Dynamic Games Played over Event Trees ⋮ Feedback Nash equilibria in a problem of optimal fishery management ⋮ Nonuniqueness of no-memory feedback equilibria in a fishery resource game ⋮ Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in differential games ⋮ Selection of a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium in a class of differential games ⋮ Stochastic games ⋮ Efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria: theory and application to dynamic fishery games ⋮ Dynamic game model of endogenous growth with consumption externalities ⋮ Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey ⋮ Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach ⋮ Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games ⋮ Stochastic differential game model of a common property fishery ⋮ Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control ⋮ Channel coordination over time: Incentive equilibria and credibility ⋮ Does flexibility facilitate sustainability of cooperation over time? A case study from environmental economics

This page was built for publication: On the Economics of International Fisheries