Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
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Publication:3328199
DOI10.2307/2297430zbMath0539.90006OpenAlexW2108491286MaRDI QIDQ3328199
Publication date: 1984
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2d760b373cd8eaeea25d7f352b92139ded85abd6
portfoliofinancediversificationfinancial intermediationincentive problemscapital structure of intermediaries
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