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Publication:3332693
zbMath0543.90002MaRDI QIDQ3332693
Publication date: 1983
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
strategy-proofnessgroup decision theoryArrow theoremCooperative votingstability of voting methodsstrategic aspects of voting
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-02) Social choice (91B14)
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