A robust resolution of Newcomb's paradox

DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9543-2zbMath1378.91034OpenAlexW3122543774WikidataQ59460951 ScholiaQ59460951MaRDI QIDQ333469

Thomas A. Weber

Publication date: 31 October 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9543-2

zbMATH Keywords

decision theoryrationalitycommitmenttime consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Cites Work

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• Niels Bohr and complementarity. An introduction.
• A continuum of commitment
• Newcomb's many solutions
• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Agreeing to disagree
• A New Take from Nozick on Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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