Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games

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Publication:333480

DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9538-ZzbMath1378.91022OpenAlexW2297909558WikidataQ59471829 ScholiaQ59471829MaRDI QIDQ333480

Boram Park, Youngsub Chun, René van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki

Publication date: 31 October 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9538-z




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