Compromising in bifocal distribution games: the average value

DOI10.1007/s11238-016-9540-5zbMath1378.91016OpenAlexW2281694507MaRDI QIDQ333483

José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, Pedro Gadea-Blanco, M. Carmen Marco-Gil

Publication date: 31 October 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9540-5

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecooperative gamenucleolusaxiomatic analysisdistribution problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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