Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
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Publication:334204
DOI10.1134/S0005117916030012zbMath1348.91109OpenAlexW2326459646MaRDI QIDQ334204
Publication date: 1 November 2016
Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117916030012
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Social choice (91B14)
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