Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey

DOI10.1134/S0005117916030012zbMath1348.91109OpenAlexW2326459646MaRDI QIDQ334204

Yuliya Veselova

Publication date: 1 November 2016

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117916030012

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• How hard is it to control an election?
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• Minimizing makespan in a two-machine flow shop with delays and unit-time operations is NP-hard
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Reducibility among Combinatorial Problems
• A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
• The complexity of theorem-proving procedures

This page was built for publication: Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey