STABLE SETS FOR SIMPLE GAMES WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES

DOI10.15807/jorsj.27.250zbMath0549.90099OpenAlexW2337789924MaRDI QIDQ3342236

Shigeo Muto

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.15807/jorsj.27.250

zbMATH Keywords

ordinal preferencesnecessary and sufficient conditionsimple gamesfinite number of alternativesStable setsexistence of a nonempty coreunique stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games ⋮ A new old solution for weak tournaments

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