Equilibrium selection in the one seller and many buyers-game

DOI10.1007/BF01289663zbMath0552.90101OpenAlexW2055625641MaRDI QIDQ3346119

Jürgen Stephan, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01289663

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionsubgame consistencynoncooperative bargainingESBORA-theoryHarsanyi-Selten theoryindivisible commodityinfinite bargaining model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. I: Theoretical preliminaries
• Game theoretical analysis of wage bargaining in a simple business cycle model
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games

This page was built for publication: Equilibrium selection in the one seller and many buyers-game