The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard

DOI10.1287/MNSC.30.1.20zbMath0558.90004OpenAlexW2124820711MaRDI QIDQ3347567

Susan I. Cohen, Martin Loeb

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.30.1.20

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationNash equilibriummoral hazardincentive schemesprofit sharingdominant equilibriumGroves scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

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