A theorem on the existence of equilibrium situations in pure stationary strategies for ergodic extensions of (2×k)-bimatrix games

DOI10.1070/RM1990v045n04ABEH002375zbMath0726.90098OpenAlexW2044999606MaRDI QIDQ3348738

Vladimir A. Gurvich

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Russian Mathematical Surveys (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1070/rm1990v045n04abeh002375

zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix gamesErgodic extensions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (5)

On Nash equilibria and improvement cycles in pure positional strategies for chess-like and backgammon-like \(n\)-person games ⋮ On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of finite games with perfect information which may have cycles. ⋮ Nash-solvable two-person symmetric cycle game forms ⋮ On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of the deterministic \(n\)-person games with perfect information and mean or total effective cost ⋮ Chess-like games may have no uniform Nash equilibria even in mixed strategies

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