Manipulation via Withholding: A Generalization

DOI10.2307/2297836zbMath0727.90016OpenAlexW2075807387MaRDI QIDQ3351105

Gyoseob Yi

Publication date: 1991

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297836

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalityindividually-rational and Pareto-optimal allocation mechanismswithholding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (5)

STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS ⋮ Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing ⋮ The Incentive Ratio in Exchange Economies ⋮ Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing ⋮ General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions

This page was built for publication: Manipulation via Withholding: A Generalization