Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
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Publication:3352805
DOI10.2307/2938332zbMath0728.90022OpenAlexW4212962244MaRDI QIDQ3352805
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/268243/files/twerp284.pdf
asymmetric informationrational expectationsdecentralized tradepairwise meetingstransmission of the information
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