Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
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Publication:3352807
DOI10.2307/2938317zbMath0728.90024OpenAlexW2044776103MaRDI QIDQ3352807
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63813
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Hierarchical systems (93A13) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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A theory of motivation and satisfaction with application to decision support ⋮ Corporate financing under moral hazard and the default risk of buyers ⋮ Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency ⋮ Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation ⋮ Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach ⋮ The Dynamics of Incentives, Productivity, and Operational Risk ⋮ The ratchet effect: a learning perspective ⋮ Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting ⋮ Dynamic screening with limited commitment ⋮ Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness. ⋮ Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships ⋮ Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard ⋮ Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard ⋮ Mixed up? That's good for motivation ⋮ On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships ⋮ Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing ⋮ A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION ⋮ Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity ⋮ After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment ⋮ Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency ⋮ Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems ⋮ The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
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