Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
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Publication:3352879
DOI10.2307/2938191zbMath0728.90103OpenAlexW2064882565MaRDI QIDQ3352879
Vincent P. Crawford, Hans H. Haller
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938191
uncertaintyoptimal strategiesfocal pointssubgame-perfect equilibriumrepeated coordination gamesidentical preferencesmultiple-equilibrium problems
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