Optimal Contracts for Teams

DOI10.2307/2527107zbMath0729.90029OpenAlexW1967138754MaRDI QIDQ3354436

John McMillan, R. Preston McAfee

Publication date: 1991

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527107

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardadverse selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (13)

Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems ⋮ The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers ⋮ Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining ⋮ Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks ⋮ A yardstick competition approach to a multi-firm regulation problem under asymmetric information ⋮ Incentives and the structure of teams ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules ⋮ Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams ⋮ Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection ⋮ Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort ⋮ Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior ⋮ Voluntary versus enforced team effort ⋮ Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting

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