Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
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Publication:3354488
DOI10.2307/2938241zbMath0729.90096OpenAlexW1966558378MaRDI QIDQ3354488
Eddie Dekel, Adam Brandenburger, Lawrence E. Blume
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938241
Decision theory (91B06) Noncooperative games (91A10) Utility theory (91B16) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Individual preferences (91B08)
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