Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing

DOI10.2307/2297950zbMath0729.90750OpenAlexW2027395801MaRDI QIDQ3354749

Tai-Yeong Chung

Publication date: 1991

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297950

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (14)

Intrinsic impediments to category captainship collaboration ⋮ Efficient investment through renegotiation of simple contracts ⋮ The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems ⋮ Customized transportation, equity participation, and cooperation performance within logistics supply chains ⋮ KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION ⋮ Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market ⋮ Holdup, search, and inefficiency ⋮ On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship ⋮ Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information ⋮ A matter of interpretation: ambiguous contracts and liquidated damages ⋮ Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements ⋮ After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment ⋮ Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999) ⋮ Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem

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