Technical Note—Traffic Equilibrium Paradoxes

DOI10.1287/trsc.25.3.240zbMath0729.90987OpenAlexW2027226174MaRDI QIDQ3356066

Stefano Catoni, Stefano Pallottino

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Transportation Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.25.3.240

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)

Related Items (7)

Collusion in atomic splittable routing games ⋮ Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in splittable congestion games ⋮ Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow ⋮ Detecting Braess paradox based on stable dynamics in general congested transportation networks ⋮ On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard ⋮ Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow ⋮ Nonadaptive Selfish Routing with Online Demands

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