Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
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Publication:3356089
DOI10.2307/2938287zbMath0729.91016OpenAlexW3124209791MaRDI QIDQ3356089
Michael L. Katz, Benjamin Hermalin
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1678w3w9
Related Items (12)
Co-investment deterrence ⋮ Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt ⋮ Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency ⋮ A Characterization of Verifiability and Observability in Contracts ⋮ On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships ⋮ Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach ⋮ Quality distortions in vertical relations ⋮ Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity ⋮ Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable? ⋮ After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment ⋮ Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency ⋮ Efficiency in sequential partnerships
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