Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3358485
DOI10.2307/2938326zbMath0731.90007OpenAlexW2024552920MaRDI QIDQ3358485
John H. Vande Vate, Alvin E. Roth
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b7f347d3abd2e29f63c9f7221e0f86361eb80e6a
Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (99)
Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies ⋮ Analysis of ground state in random bipartite matching ⋮ Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms ⋮ Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings ⋮ Corrigendum to ``On randomized matching mechanisms [Econ. Theory 8 (1996) 377--381] ⋮ Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries ⋮ A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings ⋮ Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction ⋮ Stability in dynamic matching markets ⋮ Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts ⋮ Paths to marriage stability ⋮ The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph ⋮ Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks ⋮ Paths to stability for matching markets with couples ⋮ Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets ⋮ Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance ⋮ A local interaction dynamic for the matching problem ⋮ Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems ⋮ Analysis of stochastic matching markets ⋮ Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints ⋮ Agency equilibrium ⋮ Equilibrium selection and the role of information in repeated matching markets ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Farsighted house allocation ⋮ Stochastic stability for roommate markets ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games ⋮ Stable marriages and search frictions ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems ⋮ Constitutions and groups ⋮ Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples ⋮ Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ Stochastic stability in assignment problems ⋮ Preface to the special issue on ``Group formation and farsightedness ⋮ Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents ⋮ Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities ⋮ Stability and convergence in matching processes for shared mobility systems ⋮ Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences ⋮ Paths to stability in the assignment problem ⋮ Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching ⋮ The integral stable allocation problem on graphs ⋮ Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints ⋮ Almost stable matchings by truncating the Gale-Shapley algorithm ⋮ A stochastic dynamic programming approach to decision making in arranged marriages ⋮ Matching with myopic and farsighted players ⋮ Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem ⋮ Solutions for the stable roommates problem with payments ⋮ Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching ⋮ The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective ⋮ Local search approaches in stable matching problems ⋮ A computational approach to modeling commodity markets ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) ⋮ Minimal envy and popular matchings ⋮ Local Matching Dynamics in Social Networks ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the Nash equilibrium property of an auction matching game ⋮ Random matching in the college admissions problem ⋮ The lattice of envy-free matchings ⋮ Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty ⋮ Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems ⋮ The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets ⋮ Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration ⋮ Welfare and stability in senior matching markets ⋮ The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems ⋮ Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ Random paths to stability in the roommate problem ⋮ Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market ⋮ The roommate problem with externalities ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games ⋮ Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets ⋮ The strategy structure of some coalition formation games ⋮ Decentralized matching: the role of commitment ⋮ The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments ⋮ On the accessibility of core-extensions ⋮ On the Stable Matchings That Can Be Reached When the Agents Go Marching in One By One ⋮ On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings ⋮ Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains ⋮ A New Approach to the Pareto Stable Matching Problem ⋮ Paths to stable allocations ⋮ MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY ⋮ On the existence of stable roommate matchings ⋮ Decentralized Matching Markets of Various Sizes: Similarly Stable Solutions with High Proportions of Equal Splits ⋮ Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation ⋮ ``Timing is everything and marital bliss ⋮ The evolution of social and economic networks. ⋮ Pairwise kidney exchange ⋮ Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets
This page was built for publication: Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching