Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3358486
DOI10.2307/2938301zbMath0731.90009OpenAlexW2025306987MaRDI QIDQ3358486
No author found.
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938301
monotonicityNash equilibriumbargainingimplementationcontractingdomain restrictionsocial choice mechanismrestricted veto power
Related Items (83)
Coalition formation in games of fair division ⋮ Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Selecting winners with partially honest jurors ⋮ Nash implementation and the bargaining problem ⋮ Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization ⋮ Implementation in generalized matching problems ⋮ Implementation in partial equilibrium ⋮ Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Implementing a surplus division rule ⋮ Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction ⋮ Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ Nash implementation in pure public good economies ⋮ Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability ⋮ A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation ⋮ Spatial implementation ⋮ Behavioral implementation under incomplete information ⋮ Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent ⋮ Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Complexity and repeated implementation ⋮ One-step-ahead implementation ⋮ Two-person ex post implementation ⋮ Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information ⋮ Computational implementation ⋮ Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty ⋮ Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility ⋮ Implementation via mechanisms with transfers ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Implementation without rationality assumptions ⋮ Nash implementation via hyperfunctions ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Repeated implementation and complexity considerations ⋮ A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment ⋮ Repeated implementation: a practical characterization ⋮ A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites ⋮ Nash implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Implementing the core of a two-person pure allocation game without free disposal or integer games ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences ⋮ Nash implementation without no-veto power ⋮ On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation ⋮ Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities ⋮ Reaching consensus through approval bargaining ⋮ Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms ⋮ Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations ⋮ Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Maskin's theorem with limited veto power ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ A simple model of two-stage choice ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach ⋮ Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Optimal delay in committees ⋮ Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets ⋮ An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability ⋮ The endowment game when \(n = 2\) ⋮ Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces ⋮ Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Two-agent interactive implementation ⋮ Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities ⋮ Constrained implementation ⋮ Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations ⋮ Interactive implementation ⋮ A new necessary condition for Nash implementation ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
This page was built for publication: Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
