Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
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Publication:3359963
DOI10.2307/2938171zbMath0732.90007OpenAlexW2066556274MaRDI QIDQ3359963
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938171
coalition-proof Nash equilibriumlotteriesvirtual implementationsocial choice correspondencescontinuum of pure alternatives
Related Items (57)
Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms ⋮ Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide ⋮ Credible implementation ⋮ Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games ⋮ Continuous virtual implementation: complete information ⋮ Virtual repeated implementation ⋮ Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation ⋮ Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences ⋮ One-step-ahead implementation ⋮ Meta level equilibrium selection for two illustrative noncooperative games ⋮ Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment ⋮ Approximate implementation in Markovian environments ⋮ Compromising as an equal loss principle ⋮ Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility ⋮ Implementation via mechanisms with transfers ⋮ Nash implementation via hyperfunctions ⋮ Privacy in implementation ⋮ Strictly strategy-proof auctions ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation ⋮ Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules ⋮ Nash implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ⋮ A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium ⋮ Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability ⋮ The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model ⋮ Nash implementation without no-veto power ⋮ Implementation via rights structures ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions ⋮ A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions ⋮ Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information ⋮ A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation ⋮ Smooth multibidding mechanisms ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? ⋮ Aggregation of expert opinions ⋮ Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models ⋮ Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability ⋮ Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets ⋮ Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments ⋮ Interactive implementation ⋮ Time and Nash implementation ⋮ Contingent commodities and implementation
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