Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
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Publication:3362063
DOI10.2307/2938266zbMath0734.90004OpenAlexW1979304130MaRDI QIDQ3362063
Thomas R. Palfrey, Sanjay Srivastava
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-145552688
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