Voting by Committees
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Publication:3362064
DOI10.2307/2938220zbMath0734.90006OpenAlexW2131475412MaRDI QIDQ3362064
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5d3e63e04d2f2effb992be6f219da6e050f17fb9
strategy-proofnessvoting by committeesquotaseparable preferencesnonmanipulabilitydomain of separable preferencesvoter sovereignty
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