An evolving stag-hunt game with elimination and reproduction on regular lattices
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Publication:336250
DOI10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.002zbMath1348.91048OpenAlexW2094798343MaRDI QIDQ336250
Lei Wang, Ying Zhang, Li Wang, Cheng-yi Xia
Publication date: 10 November 2016
Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.002
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