An intermediate number of neighbors promotes the emergence of generous tit-for-tat players on homogeneous networks

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2013.07.017zbMath1348.91070OpenAlexW2006866260MaRDI QIDQ336278

Liming Pan, Zhihai Rong, Hui Gao

Publication date: 10 November 2016

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.017

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Co-evolution of limited resources in the memory-based spatial evolutionary game ⋮ Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity

Cites Work

• Effects of average degree on cooperation in networked evolutionary game
• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
• Game theory and physics
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• The prisoner's dilemma in structured scale-free networks

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