Relaxation approach for equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints
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Publication:336821
DOI10.1016/j.cor.2012.06.013zbMath1348.90585OpenAlexW2062592452MaRDI QIDQ336821
Sonja Steffensen, Micha Bittner
Publication date: 10 November 2016
Published in: Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2012.06.013
relaxationnonlinear programmingnonlinear complementarity problemmathematical program with equilibrium constraintsequilibrium problem with equilibrium constraintsNash game
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33)
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