Monotonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00360zbMath1154.91409OpenAlexW1993751911MaRDI QIDQ3371162

In-Koo Cho

Publication date: 21 February 2006

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00360

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions ⋮ Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance

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