The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
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Publication:3371169
DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00366zbMath1182.91111OpenAlexW2114232831MaRDI QIDQ3371169
Publication date: 21 February 2006
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repec.org/esNAWM04/up.3648.1048859958.pdf
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