Optimal portfolio delegation when parties have different coefficients of risk aversion
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Publication:3375392
DOI10.1080/14697680500305204zbMath1134.91441OpenAlexW1974924312MaRDI QIDQ3375392
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Publication date: 8 March 2006
Published in: Quantitative Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/14697680500305204
risk sharingprincipal-agent theoryincentive inducementnon-smooth and non-concave utility optimizationpiecewise affine fee schedules
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