Comparison of Condorcet and Weber solutions on a plane: social choice versus centralization

DOI10.1016/j.cor.2013.12.007zbMath1348.91107OpenAlexW2062897229MaRDI QIDQ337680

Mozart B. C. Menezes, Rong-Bing Huang

Publication date: 10 November 2016

Published in: Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2013.12.007

zbMATH Keywords

votinglocationCondorcet

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (2)

Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations ⋮ The wisdom of voters: evaluating the Weber objective in the plane at the Condorcet solution

Cites Work

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• The wisdom of voters: evaluating the Weber objective in the plane at the Condorcet solution
• On the point for which the sum of the distances to \(n\) given points is minimum
• Outcomes of voting and planning in single facility location problems
• How bad can a voting locating be
• New perspectives in competitive location theory
• Mathematics and Politics
• A note on accelerating the weiszfeld procedure

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