Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.004zbMath1371.91051OpenAlexW2155090943MaRDI QIDQ337788

Niall Hughes

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/82165/2/WRAP_ec-131016-hughes_jet.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

plurality rulestrategic votingPoisson gamesDuverger's lawlegislative elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (5)

The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games ⋮ Strategic stability in Poisson games ⋮ Large elections and interim turnout ⋮ Poisson-Cournot games ⋮ The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting

Cites Work

• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Large Poisson games
• Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
• One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
• A Structural Model of Government Formation

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