Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.005zbMath1371.91069OpenAlexW2512859027MaRDI QIDQ337790

Tingjun Liu

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.005

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designbidder heterogeneityequity bids

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations ⋮ Optimal revenue-sharing mechanisms with seller commitment to ex-post effort ⋮ The broker-optimal bilateral trading mechanisms with linear contracts ⋮ Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options ⋮ Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs ⋮ Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types

Cites Work

• Auctions with cross-shareholdings
• On bidding with securities: risk aversion and positive dependence
• Securities Auctions under Moral Hazard: An Experimental Study*
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Ex Post Information in Auctions
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• High bids and broke winners

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