Dissolving a partnership dynamically

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.006zbMath1371.91119OpenAlexW2512089382MaRDI QIDQ337803

Matt Van Essen, John Wooders

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10453/54807

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicfair divisionpartnershipauction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Dissolving a partnership securely ⋮ Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers ⋮ Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects ⋮ Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value

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