Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.003zbMath1371.91122OpenAlexW3123476291MaRDI QIDQ337806

Tomasz Piskorski, Mark M. Westerfield

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardmonitoringdynamic contractsendogenous financing constraintsmanagerial compensation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (12)

Scale effects in dynamic contracting ⋮ A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard ⋮ Monitoring innovation ⋮ Termination as an incentive device ⋮ Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts ⋮ General diffusion processes as limit of time-space Markov chains ⋮ Research on investment incorporating both environmental performance and long (short) term financial performance of firms ⋮ Wasserstein convergence rates for random bit approximations of continuous Markov processes ⋮ Optimal Monitoring Schedule in Dynamic Contracts ⋮ A functional limit theorem for coin tossing Markov chains ⋮ Dynamic contracts with random monitoring ⋮ Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion

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