Approval voting and scoring rules with common values

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.002zbMath1372.91032OpenAlexW1513348371MaRDI QIDQ337811

Santiago Oliveros, David S. Ahn

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

plurality ruleinformation aggregationscoring ruleapproval voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections ⋮ (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives ⋮ Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules ⋮ Information aggregation with runoff voting ⋮ Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory ⋮ Bargaining through approval

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
• One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

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