Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.003zbMath1372.91044OpenAlexW2519413772MaRDI QIDQ337818

Gabriel D. Carroll

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessadverse selectioncontagioninformation structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Robust mechanisms: the curvature case

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