Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
From MaRDI portal
Publication:337821
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.006zbMath1372.91068OpenAlexW2525820812MaRDI QIDQ337821
Pricila Maziero, Laurence Ales
Publication date: 3 November 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.006
incomplete marketsoptimal taxationprivate informationnon-exclusive contractsoptimal dynamic social insurance
Lua error in Module:PublicationMSCList at line 37: attempt to index local 'msc_result' (a nil value).
Related Items (4)
Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance ⋮ Linear price equilibria in a non-exclusive insurance market ⋮ Insurance contracts and financial markets ⋮ Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
- Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing
- Revision proofness
- On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
- The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-insurance economies
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Reconsideration-proofness: A refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency
- Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage
- The Surprising Power of Age-Dependent Taxes
- Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets
- A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation
- Competitive Non-linear Pricing and Bundling
- Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
- Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
- Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation
- Insurance and Taxation over the Life Cycle
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
This page was built for publication: Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
