Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.006zbMath1372.91068OpenAlexW2525820812MaRDI QIDQ337821

Pricila Maziero, Laurence Ales

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.006

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete marketsoptimal taxationprivate informationnon-exclusive contractsoptimal dynamic social insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (4)

Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance ⋮ Linear price equilibria in a non-exclusive insurance market ⋮ Insurance contracts and financial markets ⋮ Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection

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