Evolutionary coalitional games

DOI10.1007/s13235-015-0145-3zbMath1348.91043DBLPjournals/dga/Platkowski16OpenAlexW2061290906WikidataQ59473898 ScholiaQ59473898MaRDI QIDQ338220

Tadeusz Płatkowski

Publication date: 4 November 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0145-3

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsShapley valuepopulation dynamicssocial dilemmasmultiplayer games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

Chris Cannings: a life in games ⋮ Shapley value redistribution of social wealth fosters cooperation in social dilemmas ⋮ On benefits of cooperation under strategic power ⋮ Greed and fear in multiperson social dilemmas ⋮ On derivation and evolutionary classification of social dilemma games

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