Voting to Tell Others

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDW056zbMath1471.91126OpenAlexW2130948386MaRDI QIDQ3382372

Gautam Rao, John A. List, Stefano DellaVigna, Ulrike Malmendier

Publication date: 21 September 2021

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw056

zbMATH Keywords

get-out-the-votebehavioral political economystructural behavioral economicsturn out

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Related Items (9)

The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study ⋮ ``Giving in to social pressure ⋮ Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: is sharing caring? ⋮ A theory of strategic voting with non-instrumental motives ⋮ Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice ⋮ Lying opportunities and incentives to Lie: reference dependence versus reputation ⋮ The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting ⋮ Social pressure in networks induces public good provision ⋮ Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees

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