Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets

DOI10.1093/restud/rdw041zbMath1471.91345OpenAlexW2185739321MaRDI QIDQ3382383

SangMok Lee

Publication date: 21 September 2021

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79495/

zbMATH Keywords

random bipartite graphtwo-sided matchinglarge marketstable matching mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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