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Publication:3384061
zbMath1484.91065MaRDI QIDQ3384061
Publication date: 14 December 2021
Full work available at URL: http://eptcs.web.cse.unsw.edu.au/paper.cgi?TARK2017.8
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
strategic stabilitystrong rationalizabilityforward inductionstrong beliefstrong-\(\Delta\)-rationalizability
Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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